Investment Drivers in a Fishery with Tradable Quotas
研究了可交易配额制度下渔业企业的投资驱动因素，发现企业间投资差异主要由地理位置、家族企业性质及配额购买价格等非效率因素解释，配额交易未必提升资源配置效率。
I analyze drivers of investment in a fishery with tradable quotas. Theory predicts that tradable quotas increase efficiency because efficient firms buy quotas from less efficient firms. I identify what drives investment, using data on Norwegian purse seiners. Results show that while the basic economic investment model explains investment within firms, it does not explain differences between firms. These differences are explained by other firm-specific factors such as geographical location, whether it is a family firm, and prices paid for quotas. Consequently, investment strategies are not necessarily driven by efficiency considerations, and quota trade may not increase allocative efficiency. <i></i>