Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard
研究了委托人不知搜索收益分布且无法观察搜索过程时的最优搜索政策，发现两种信息不对称相互强化导致搜索几乎必然低效，最优报酬是简单奖金合同菜单。
The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two information asymmetries are mutually enforcing each other; if one is relaxed, delegated search is efficient. With both asymmetries prevailing simultaneously, search is almost surely inefficient (it is stopped too early). Second-best remuneration is shown to optimally utilize a menu of simple bonus contracts. In contrast to standard adverse selection problems, indirect nonlinear tariffs are strictly dominated.