Strategic sophistication and attention in games: An eye-tracking study
通过眼动追踪测量双人标准型博弈中的视觉信息获取模式，发现个体存在异质性但稳定的信息获取模式，可预测均衡选择并将非均衡反应归因于认知限制或社会动机。
We used eye-tracking to measure the dynamic patterns of visual information acquisition in two-player normal-form games. Participants played one-shot games in which either, neither, or only one of the players had a dominant strategy. First, we performed a mixture models cluster analysis to group participants into types according to the pattern of visual information acquisition observed in a single class of games. Then, we predicted agents' choices in different classes of games and observed that patterns of visual information acquisition were game invariant. Our method allowed us to predict whether the decision process would lead to equilibrium choices or not, and to attribute out-of-equilibrium responses to limited cognitive capacities or social motives. Our results suggest the existence of individually heterogeneous-but-stable patterns of visual information acquisition based on subjective levels of strategic sophistication and social preferences.