INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND MULTIMARKET CONTACT*
分析了跨国企业在多个司法辖区运营时，当地反垄断执法如何影响卡特尔的形成与稳定性，发现市场间合谋的相互依赖会导致执法外部性，且执法力度与市场整合程度呈非单调关系。
This article analyzes cartel formation and international antitrust enforcement when multinational firms operate in several jurisdictions with local antitrust authorities. We are concerned with how the sustainability of collusion in one local market is affected by the existence of collusion in other markets when they are linked by a negative demand relationship. The interdependence of cartel stability across markets leads to potential externalities in antitrust enforcement across jurisdictions. Local antitrust enforcement equilibrium enforcement may exhibit a nonmonotonicity in the degree of market integration. We compare it with globally optimal antitrust enforcement policy and discuss the role of international antitrust coordination.