On the Existence of Satisfactory Dynamic Revelation Processes for Public Good Provision
证明，在公共品供给的动态过程中，不存在同时满足激励相容、可操作且实现帕累托最优的揭示过程，类似于静态机制的不可能性结果。
Various allocation procedures for efficient provision of public goods have recently been proposed. These procedures can be divided into mechanisM8 and time continuous dynamic processes. Studies on mechanisms have shown that no mechanism exists which is incentive compatible and individually rational and achieves a Pareto optimal allocation. It is shown in this paper that a similar nonexistence result can also be obtained with respect to dynamic processes. That is, in a reasonably specified subcategory of dynamic processes, it is proved that no incentive-compatible process exists which is workable and achieves a Pareto optimal allocation.