Collusion in Dynamic Buyer-Determined Reverse Auctions
研究了实际采购中常见的动态非约束性反向拍卖，发现这种竞价形式使供应商能够合谋，导致非竞争性价格，理论和实证均支持这一结论。
Although binding reverse auctions have attracted a good deal of interest in the academic literature, in practice, dynamic nonbinding reverse auctions are the norm in procurement. In those, suppliers submit price quotes and can respond to quotes of their competitors during a live auction event. However, the lowest quote does not necessarily determine the winner. The buyer decides after the contest, taking further supplier information into account, on who will be awarded the contract. We show, both theoretically and empirically, that this bidding format enables suppliers to collude, thus leading to noncompetitive prices. This paper was accepted by Teck-Hua Ho, behavioral economics.