LABOR SUPPLY OF POLITICIANS
利用欧洲议会议员数据，研究薪酬对议员构成和行为的影响，发现提高薪酬增加连任比例但降低议员质量，对努力和立法产出无显著影响。
Using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we examine the impact of salaries on the composition and the behavior of legislators. Employing a differences-in-differences approach, we exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs' salaries which had previously differed by as much as a factor of 10. Increasing salaries raises the fraction of MEPs who run for re-election but decreases the quality of elected MEPs (proxied by college quality). Salary has no discernible impact on effort or legislation output. Higher salaries induce more political competition.