Price discrimination through communication
研究了当买方可能提供价值证据时，卖方最大化收入的最优机制，发现接近买方细分透明的条件是机制确定性的关键，否则最优机制混合了二级和三级价格歧视。
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third degree price discrimination--independently of non-evidence characteristics. We also find another sufficient condition depending on both evidence and valuations, whose content is that evidence is hierarchical. When these conditions are violated, the optimal mechanism contains a mixture of second and third degree price discrimination, where the former is implemented via sale of lotteries. We interpret such randomization in terms of the probability of negotiation breakdown in a bargaining protocol whose sequential equilibrium implements the optimal mechanism.