Government Transfers and Political Support
利用乌拉圭大型反贫困现金转移项目PANES的资格评分断点，发现受益家庭对实施该项目的现任政府的支持率比前任政府高出11到13个百分点，且该效应在项目结束后仍持续。
This paper estimates the impact of a large anti-poverty cash transfer program, the Uruguayan PANES, on political support for the government that implemented it. Using the discontinuity in program assignment based on a pretreatment eligibility score, we find that beneficiary households are 11 to 13 percentage points more likely to favor the current government relative to the previous government. Political support effects persist after the program ends. Our results are consistent with theories of rational but poorly informed voters who use policy to infer politicians' redistributive preferences or competence, as well as with behavioral economics explanations grounded in reciprocity.