QUALITY DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION*
研究了双寡头和卡特尔下水平差异化产品的质量披露成本，发现卡特尔比双寡头更倾向于披露，福利比较取决于披露成本高低；两种市场结构下披露对总剩余过多、对消费者剩余不足。
We analyze costly quality disclosure with horizontally differentiated products under duopoly and a cartel, and characterize the effect of competition on disclosure and welfare. We show that expected disclosure is higher under a cartel than under duopoly, and the welfare comparison depends on the level of disclosure cost: when the disclosure cost is low, welfare is higher under a cartel than duopoly, but when the disclosure cost is high, welfare is higher under duopoly. In either market structure, disclosure is excessive in terms of total surplus, but insufficient in terms of consumer surplus.