REGULATION, IMPERFECT COMPETITION, AND THE U.S. ABORTION MARKET
利用美国堕胎市场数据估计均衡模型，发现需求端监管是堕胎下降的主因，且收紧限制可能因竞争格局变化反而增加堕胎数量。
The U.S. abortion market has grown increasingly concentrated recently, while many states tightened abortion laws. Using data on abortion providers, I estimate an equilibrium model of demand, price competition, entry and exit, to capture the effect of regulation on industry dynamics. Estimates show regulations played an important role in determining the abortion market structure and evolution. Counterfactual simulations reveal increases in demand‐aimed regulation were the most important observed factor in explaining recent abortion declines. Simulating Utah's regulatory regime nationally shows tightening abortion restrictions can increase abortions in equilibrium, mainly through tilting the competitive landscape toward low‐price providers.