Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner's Curse?: An Experimental Study
通过最大博弈实验，研究赢者诅咒是否能用允许不一致信念但保持最优反应行为的模型来解释，发现不同版本下行为差异不大，质疑了信念驱动赢者诅咒的理论。
We use a second-price common-value auction, called the maximal game, to experimentally study whether the winner's curse (WC) can be explained by models which retain best-response behavior but allow for inconsistent beliefs. We compare behavior in a regular version of the maximal game, where the WC can be explained by inconsistent beliefs, to behavior in versions where such explanations are less plausible. We find little evidence of differences in behavior. Overall, our study casts a serious doubt on theories that posit the WC is driven by beliefs. Copyright 2010 The Econometric Society.