Insecure Land Rights and Share Tenancy: Evidence from Madagascar
研究了土地产权不安全如何影响租佃合同的选择，利用马达加斯加数据发现产权不安全会推动地主选择分成合同，而传统风险分担假说未获支持。
Most studies of tenurial insecurity focus on its effects on investment. This paper studies the hitherto unexplored relationship between tenurial insecurity and land tenancy contracts. Based on distinct features of formal law and customary rights in Madagascar, this paper augments the canonical model of sharecropping by making the strength of the landlord’s property right increasing in the amount of risk she bears within the contract. Using data on landlords’ subjective perceptions in rural Madagascar, empirical tests support the hypothesis that insecure property rights drive contract choice but offer little support in favor of the canonical risk sharing hypothesis. <i></i>