Centralized Common-Pool Management and Local Community Participation
通过公共池塘资源实验，研究允许资源使用者对管理机构的激励结构进行投票是否能提高资源利用效率，发现投票能促进合作，但多数情况下只有少数人支持该激励结构。
<i>We use common-pool resource experiments to explore whether allowing resource users to vote on a natural resource management institution’s incentive structure enhances the efficiency of resource use. We hypothesize that voting enables users to communicate their willingness to limit excess resource exploitation. Compared to games in which appropriate incentives are imposed exogenously, behavior is more cooperative conditional on a majority having voted for that structure. However, the effectiveness of this form of local community participation in resource management is limited as in more than half of the cases, only a minority votes in favor of implementing that incentive structure.</i>