Warranties, Durability, and Maintenance: Two-sided Moral Hazard in a Continuous-Time Model
用连续时间模型分析双边道德风险如何影响保修设计，发现保修期越长越能激励生产者提高耐用性，但会削弱消费者维护动机，保修期限取决于两类道德风险的相对严重程度。
Double moral hazard in continuous time generates the familiar warranty pattern with full coverage for an initial block of time. The more complete the warranty, the better the producer's durability incentives and the worse the consumer's maintenance incentives. Using continuous time highlights the need for some warranty bound to avoid reaching the first-best as an unreasonable limit. Early in the paper, an exogenous bound is used, while later the bound arises endogenously from the possibility of abuse and repair. A quadratic example shows that the warranty's duration depends on the relative severity of the two moral hazard problems.