Antitrust Leniency with Multiproduct Colluders
用全球博弈方法研究多产品合谋者面临的反垄断宽大政策设计，发现跨产品关联宽大可能增加首个产品定罪概率但降低后续产品定罪，企业可能利用低价值产品申请宽大来保护高价值产品。
We use a global games approach to model alternative implementations of an antitrust leniency program as applied to multiproduct colluders. We derive several policy design lessons; e.g., we show that it is possible that linking leniency across products increases the likelihood of conviction in the first product investigated but reduces it in subsequent products. Thus, firms may have an incentive to form sacrificial cartels and apply for leniency in less valuable products to reduce convictions in more valuable products. Cartel profiling can mitigate this undesirable effect, but also reduces the probability of conviction in the first product investigated.