Valuation, Adverse Selection, and Market Collapses
研究了投资者为获取未来收益信息而投入资源（估值）如何引发逆向选择问题，发现估值与市场价格之间存在战略互补性，导致多重均衡，其中无估值均衡效率最高，而转向估值均衡则类似信贷紧缩。
We study a market for funding real investment where valuation—meaning investors devoting resources to acquiring information about future payoffs—creates an adverse selection problem. Unlike previous models, more valuation is associated with lower market prices and so greater returns to valuation. This strategic complementarity in the capacity to do valuation generates multiple equilibria. With multiple equilibria, the equilibrium without valuation is most efficient despite funding some unprofitable investments. Switches to valuation equilibria, valuation runs, look like credit crunches. A large investor can ensure the efficient equilibrium only if it can precommit to a price and potentially, only if subsidized.