A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions
提出一种新机制设计方法，用于对两个异质竞拍者的标准拍卖进行收益排序，即使没有一种拍卖在所有类型组合下占优，也能比较。该方法简化分析并统一现有文献结果，可处理保留价格和外部性，并扩展到多竞拍者环境。
I propose a new mechanism design approach to the problem of ranking standard auctions with two heterogeneous bidders. A key feature of the approach is that it may be possible to rank two auctions even if neither dominates the other for all combinations of types. The approach simplifies the analysis and unifies results in the existing literature. Roughly speaking, the first-price auction is more profitable than the second-price auction when the strong bidder's distribution is flatter and more disperse than the weak bidder's distribution. Applications include auctions with one-sided externalities. Moreover, contrary to previous work, reserve prices are easily handled. Finally, the method can be extended to some environments with many bidders.