A, B or C? Experimental Tests of IPO Mechanisms
通过实验比较四种IPO机制（统一拍卖、簿记建档、Ausubel拍卖和竞争性IPO），发现竞争性IPO能促进信息揭示并减少抑价，Ausubel拍卖在价格发现和抑价方面优于统一时钟拍卖和簿记建档。
Empirical research has provided extensive evidence on the ine¢ ciency of bookbuilding in controlling underpricing.Both academics and practitioners have investigated this phenomenon proposing innovative o¤ering methodologies.In this paper we explore the information revelation and underpricing properties of two baseline models, uniform auctions and bookbuilding, and two newly proposed mechanisms, Ausubel auction and Competitive IPO.Our …ndings con…rm the empirical weaknesses of bookbuilding and provide hints that standard auctions may stimulate less bidding.However, (a) the Competitive IPO features increase competition both among banks and among investors resulting in more information revelation and less underpricing than standard bookbuilding; and (b) the Ausubel auction yields superior price discovery and underpricing outcomes than uniform clock auction and bookbuilding.Our experimental results provide novel insights to the ongoing debate on optimal equity o¤ering mechanisms, suggesting that the solution to current issuing methodologies shortcomings may require the development of a "hybrid" procedure blending properties of existing and new mechanisms.