Bonus-Driven Repurchases
研究发现，当CEO的奖金直接与每股收益挂钩时，公司更可能进行股票回购，尤其是在每股收益刚好低于奖金门槛时。回购增加了CEO获得奖金的可能性，但长期来看没有超额收益。
Abstract Using a large hand-collected database of chief executive officer (CEO) bonus structures, we find that when a CEO’s bonus is directly tied to earnings per share (EPS), his company is more likely to conduct a buyback. This effect is especially pronounced when a company’s EPS is right below the threshold for a bonus award. Share repurchasing increases the probability the CEO receives a bonus and the magnitude of that bonus, but only when bonus pay is EPS based. Bonus-driven repurchasing firms do not exhibit positive long-run abnormal returns.