Bankruptcy Litigation and Relationship Banking
分析了破产法院的两种判决错误如何影响关系型银行业务的价值：误判有偿付能力的企业破产会降低银行债务成本，而误判破产企业有偿付能力则会提升关系型银行业务的价值。
Abstract This paper analyzes how bankruptcy litigation affects the value of relationship banking. In our model, bankruptcy courts may make type 1 errors, i.e., they may declare that an insolvent firm is solvent; and they may make type 2 errors, i.e., they may declare that a solvent firm is insolvent. Our model provides four results. First, the cost of bank debt decreases when the probability that bankruptcy courts make type 2 errors increases. Second, the value of relationship banking increases when the probability that bankruptcy courts make type 1 errors increases. Third, the cost of credit intermediation decreases when the probability that bankruptcy courts make type 2 errors increases. Fourth, the diversification mechanism does not fully solve the delegated monitoring problem.