Repeated Rounds with Price Feedback in Experimental Auction Valuation: An Adversarial Collaboration
通过两个实验，研究了第二价格拍卖中价格反馈对理性行为的影响，发现价格反馈增加了偏好反转和偏离纳什均衡的出价，但重复轮次本身能改善拍卖结果。
It is generally thought that market outcomes are improved with the provision of market information. As a result, the use of repeated rounds with price feedback has become standard practice in the applied experimental auction valuation literature. We conducted two experiments to determine how rationally subjects behave with and without price feedback in a second‐price auction. Results from an auction for lotteries show that subjects exposed to price feedback are significantly more likely to commit preference reversals. However, this irrationality diminishes in later rounds. Results from an induced value auction indicate that price feedback caused greater deviations from the Nash equilibrium bidding strategy. Our results suggest that while bidding on the same item repeatedly improves auction outcomes (i.e., reduced preference reversals or bids closer to induced values), this improvement is not the result of price feedback.