Regulatory Risk Under Optimal Monopoly Regulation
研究最优垄断监管中监管风险的影响，发现监管者对风险的反应取决于需求曲线的凹凸性，且仁慈监管者的风险偏好可能与企业和消费者相矛盾。
I develop a tractable framework to study regulatory risk under optimal monopoly regulation. It captures increasing regulatory risk as mean‐preserving spreads of two regulatory variables: weights attached to profits and costs of public funds. The regulator’s reaction to regulatory risk depends on the curvature of demand. For convex (concave) demand, it yields a positive (negative) information rent effect that benefits (hurts) the firm. Consumers dislike a positive information rent effect but their risk preferences also depend on their tendency to dislike fluctuations in consumption. Risk preference of benevolent regulators may contradict both those of the firm and consumers.