Competition and Managerial Incentives: Board Independence, Information and Predation
研究了董事会独立性如何作为管理层承诺不损害股东利益的机制，但独立董事会依赖产品市场信息时易受竞争对手信息操纵，最优董事会类型需权衡代理成本与掠夺成本，发现只有较弱企业更适合独立董事会，且竞争加剧时其益处更大。
We show that the choice of an independent board serves as a commitment by management that it will abstain from ex post decisions that are not in shareholder interests. However, an independent board, relying on product market information to make or approve strategic decisions, also makes the firm more vulnerable to predatory information manipulation by its industry rivals. The optimal board type trades off the cost of the agency problem with that from predation. We show that only for weaker firms is an independent board the better choice, and for such firms, increased competition makes board independence even more beneficial.