Tagging and Targeting of Energy Efficiency Subsidies
研究发现，三项重要的能效补贴主要由更富有、拥有住房且更关注能源成本的消费者使用，表明这些补贴未能有效瞄准其旨在纠正的市场失灵，但标记方法可带来巨大效率提升。
A corrective tax or subsidy is “well-targeted” if it primarily affects choices that are more distorted by market failures. Energy efficiency subsidies are designed to correct multiple distortions: externalities, credit constraints, “landlord-tenant” information asymmetries, imperfect information, and inattention. We show that three important energy efficiency subsidies are primarily taken up by consumers who are wealthier, own their own homes, and are more informed about and attentive to energy costs. This suggests that these subsidies are poorly targeted at the market failures they were designed to address. However, we show that “tagging” can lead to large efficiency gains.