COMPETITIVE MARKETS WITH ENDOGENOUS HEALTH RISKS
研究了职业选择影响健康分布的经济体，发现帕累托效率需要职业间转移支付，且竞争均衡无法实现最优，线性健康保险补贴可提升效率。
We study an economy where agents' productivity and labor endowment depend on their health status, and indivisible occupational choices affect individual health distributions. We show that Pareto efficiency requires cross-transfers across occupations. Moreover, workers with relatively less safe jobs must get positive transfers whenever labor supply is not very reactive to wages, a condition in line with the findings of a large empirical literature. In these instances, compensating wage differentials equalizing the utilities of ex-ante identical workers in different jobs undermine ex-ante efficiency. Moreover, competitive equilibria where only assets with deterministic payoffs are traded are not first-best. Finally, we show that simple transfer schemes, implemented through linear subsidies to health insurance, enhance efficiency.