Strategic Trade Policies with Endogenous Mode of Competition
建立了一个容量-价格竞争模型，该模型的均衡结果随容量约束重要性从伯特兰转向古诺。利用该模型重新审视战略性贸易政策理论，发现容量补贴这一单一政策可在任何竞争模式下增加本国收入，表明信息约束不一定会削弱政府干预国际竞争的动机。
This paper develops a model of capacity-price competition in which the equilibrium outcome ranges from the Bertrand to the Cournot outcome as capacity constraints become more important. This model is employed to reexamine aspects of strategic-trade-policy theory and, in particular, the theory's well-known sensitivity to the mode of oligopolistic competition. Among other things, the analysis identifies a simple single-rate policy, namely, capacity subsidies, which can increase the home country's income regardless of the mode of competition. This suggests that the presence of critical informational constraints need not diminish governments' incentives to distort the international competition. Copyright 1996 by American Economic Association.