Play It Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning From Finitely Repeated Dilemma Games
实验研究了在有限重复困境博弈中，当参与者可以自主选择伙伴时，声誉记录对合作行为的影响，发现高合作回报和良好信息下，外生重启后合作声誉投资增加。
Often the fuller the reputational record people's actions generate, the greater their incentive to earn a reputation for cooperation. However, inability to “wipe clean” one's past record might trap some agents who initially underappreciate reputation's value in a cycle of bad behaviour, whereas a clean slate could have been followed by their “reforming” themselves. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate what subjects learn from playing a finitely repeated dilemma game with endogenous, symmetric partner choice. We find that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in cooperative reputation grows following exogenous restarts, although earlier end-game behaviours are observed.