基于权利的渔业中的生产效率与退出

Production Efficiency and Exit in Rights-Based Fisheries

Land Economics · 2013
被引 18
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

研究了在转向个体可转让配额(ITQ)管理后,技术效率低的渔船更可能退出渔业,帮助预测ITQ实施前的整合程度和分布。

Abstract

Economic theory predicts that the least-efficient vessels are more likely to exit a fishery following the transition to an individual transferable quota (ITQ) management regime. Tools are needed to help analysts predict the likely degree and distribution of consolidation prior to implementing ITQ programs. This research utilizes a one-stage estimation procedure to determine the degree to which one’s technical inefficiency preceding an ITQ regime influences the likelihood of exiting. Our results indicate that a vessel’s measure of technical inefficiency is a significant and positive factor in explaining whether it exits the fishery following the implementation of ITQs. <i></i>

个体可转让配额技术效率渔船退出渔业管理