COMPETITION AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTS: THE ROLE OF UNEMPLOYMENT AS A DISCIPLINARY DEVICE
研究劳动力市场竞争如何影响关系合约的出现及其克服道德风险的效果，发现劳动力供不应求时有效关系合约仍会出现，且竞争增强不会降低效率，反而通过提高工资和互惠动机提升努力水平。
When workers are faced with the threat of unemployment, their relationship with a particular firm becomes valuable. As a result, a worker may comply with the terms of a relational contract that demands high effort even when performance is not enforceable by a third party. But can relational contracts motivate high effort when workers can easily find alternative jobs? We examine how competition for labor affects the emergence of relational contracts and their effectiveness in overcoming moral hazard in the labor market. We show that effective relational contracts do emerge in a market with excess demand for labor. Long-term relationships turn out to be less frequent when there is excess demand for labor than they are in a market characterized by exogenous unemployment. However, stronger competition for labor does not impair labor market efficiency: higher wages induced by competition lead to higher effort out of concerns for reciprocity.