Configurations of Governance Structure, Generic Strategy, and Firm Size: Opening the Black Box of Value Creation In International Joint Ventures
研究了国际合资企业的治理结构（共享控制或主导控制）和竞争战略（成本领先、差异化或混合）如何单独及共同影响美国母公司股票市场对合资企业绩效的预期，并揭示了企业规模的调节作用。
To better identify the antecedents of joint venture ( JV ) performance, we investigate the singular and joint effects of: (1) JV governance structure (shared control; dominant control); and (2) JV competitive strategy (cost leadership; differentiation; hybrid) on stock market expectations of American parents' JV performance. We combine arguments from the JV governance, generic strategy, and organizational studies literatures to delineate the strategy‐structure‐size configurations required for creating superior abnormal returns. In doing so, we also unpack the moderating role of firm size vis‐à‐vis strategy‐performance and structure‐performance relationships. Our efforts contribute to a more sophisticated understanding of the mechanisms for creating shareholder value in American manufacturing firms who participate in international JVs. We generate five hypotheses and find full or partial support for them in our sample of almost 200 international JVs.