Controlling opportunism in vertical contracting when production precedes sales
研究在按订单生产的纵向合约中，零售商无法观察彼此库存时，转售价格维持（RPM）和回购合约等工具如何帮助生产商控制机会主义并恢复垄断力量，结论是对RPM更宽松的政策不太可能影响生产商控制机会主义的能力。
In a make‐to‐stock vertical contracting setting with private contracts, when retailers do not observe each other's stocks before choosing their prices, an opportunism problem always exist in contract equilibria but public market‐wide Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) can restore monopoly power. However other widely used tools which do not fall under antitrust scrutiny and require only private bilateral contracts, such as buyback contracts, also allow the producer to fully exercise his monopoly power. We conclude that a more lenient policy toward RPM is unlikely to affect the producer's ability to control opportunism.