Efficient Competition Through Cheap Talk: The Case of Competing Auctions
研究了在大型市场中，拍卖人通过发送廉价谈话信息竞争竞标者，发现采用有效第一价格拍卖时存在真实揭示类型的均衡，而第二价格拍卖则无信息均衡。
We consider a large market where auctioneers with private reservation values compete for bidders by announcing cheap-talk messages. If auctioneers run efficient first-price auctions, then there always exists an equilibrium in which each auctioneer truthfully reveals her type. The equilibrium is constrained efficient, assigning more bidders to auctioneers with larger gains from trade. The choice of the trading mechanism is crucial for the result. Most notably, the use of second-price auctions (equivalently, ex post bidding) leads to the non-existence of any informative equilibrium. We examine the robustness of our finding in various dimensions, including finite markets and equilibrium selection.