Are Analysts’ Recommendations for Other Investment Banks Biased?
研究发现，股票分析师对自己银行有银团合作关系的其他投资银行会给出更乐观的推荐，且这种乐观推荐可能是为了争取加入银团，之后也确实会获得更多银团业务。
This paper provides evidence of a “Potential conflict of interest by equity analysts” who issue recommendations for investment banks that are related to their own bank through syndication. Analysts issue significantly more optimistic recommendations for investment banks with which their bank is syndicated. Recommending banks upgrade their recommendations just before a relation is initiated, suggesting that they use analyst optimism as a means of currying favor with the syndicate lead in hopes of being invited to join. It also appears that as part of a quid pro quo of sorts, relatively optimistic recommendations are rewarded with more syndicate appointments in the year after the recommendations.