Dynamic Competition With Random Demand and Costless Search: A Theory of Price Posting
研究了需求不确定下完全竞争市场的价格标价动态模型，企业提前生产并在观察到前期销售后为未售出产品标价，消费者随机到达并选择购买或延迟，最终实现有效配置和价格连续上升后回调。
This paper studies a dynamic model of perfectly competitive price posting under demand uncertainty. Firms must produce output in advance. After observing aggregate sales in prior periods, firms post prices for their unsold output. In each period, the demand of a new batch of consumers is randomly activated. Existing customers who have not yet bought and then new customers arrive at the market in random order, observe the posted prices, and either purchase at the lowest available price or delay their purchase decision. We construct a sequential equilibrium in which the output produced and its allocation across consumers is efficient. Thus consumers endogenously sort themselves efficiently, with the highest valuations purchasing first. Transaction prices in each period rise continuously, as firms become more optimistic about demand, followed by a market correction. By the last period, prices are market clearing.