The impacts of performance relative to analyst forecasts and analyst coverage on firm R&D intensity
从代理理论视角，研究管理者在面临分析师预测压力时是否会削减研发支出，以及分析师覆盖能否缓解这一代理问题。基于1979-2005年美国制造业企业数据检验假设。
Abstract Taking an agency theory perspective of managers as risk averse and self‐interest seeking and focusing on externally generated analyst forecasts as the performance target, we propose that managers tend to cut R&D expenses when they are under pressure to meet analyst forecasts, especially when they face an increase in employment risk after missing the forecasts. We further argue that analyst coverage can serve as an external monitoring mechanism to help contain this agency problem. We test these arguments with data from a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms during the period of 1979 to 2005. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.