EDUCATIONAL VOUCHERS AND CREAM SKIMMING*
研究如何设计教育券，在引入私立学校竞争、提高效率的同时，避免出现私立学校只招收最富裕和最优秀学生的精英筛选现象。
Epple and Romano (1998) show equilibrium provision of education by public and private schools has the latter skim off the wealthiest and most‐able students, and universal vouchers lead to further cream skimming. Here we study voucher design that injects private‐school competition and increases technical efficiencies without cream skimming. Conditioning vouchers on student ability without restriction on participating schools' policies fails to affect significantly cream skimming. However, by adding restrictions like tuition constraints, such vouchers can reap the benefits of school competition without increased stratification. This is accomplished while allowing voluntary participation in the voucher system and without tax increases.