Information Policy in Tournaments with Sabotage
研究了锦标赛中破坏行为如何削弱员工的生产性努力，并证明隐藏中间绩效信息能有效提升努力水平，实验证据支持这一结论。
Abstract Sabotage is one of the main problems of tournament‐like reward schemes. Workers who are leading in a tournament are more dangerous rivals, and are therefore sabotaged more heavily. This implies that there is an extra cost to becoming a leader and, hence, to choosing high productive effort in the early stages of a tournament. The incentives to exert productive effort are thereby reduced. We show that this problem can be solved by concealing intermediate information on the performances of workers (i.e., by clever information management). Moreover, we offer experimental evidence indicating that such information management does increase productive efforts.