TESTING ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES IN THE FIELD: THREAT, MORAL APPEAL AND SOCIAL INFORMATION
通过大规模实地实验，测试了不同信件内容对电视许可费潜在逃缴者的合规影响，发现强调高检测风险的威胁信件显著提升合规率，而道德呼吁和社会信息整体效果不显著。
We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce \ncompliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders \nof TV license fees. We find a strong effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in \ncompliance. Among different mailings, a threat treatment which makes a high detection risk \nsalient has a significant deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others' behavior enhances compliance on aggregate. However, the information condition has a weak positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common. (authors' abstract)