Can Taxes Tame the Banks? Evidence from the European Bank Levies
研究了2007-2008金融危机后欧洲多国对银行借款征税的效果，发现银行虽增加股权融资，但资产风险上升，风险从负债端转向资产端，削弱了政府干预效果。
Abstract Following the 2007–2008 financial crisis, a large number of countries introduced levies on bank borrowing intended to reduce risk in the financial sector. This article studies the behavioural responses to bank levies and finds that banks exposed to levies increased their reliance on equity funding, but at the same time increased the risk of their assets; banks shifted risk from the liability side of their balance sheets to the asset side, which mitigated the impact of government intervention. Our analysis also shows that any reduction in total risk was concentrated among banks that pose no or little threat to financial stability.