Repossession and the Democratization of Credit
利用巴西2004年简化收回抵押汽车程序的信贷改革，发现改革扩大了风险较高的自雇借款人的信贷，但同时也增加了违约率，揭示了抵押品和收回机制在信贷自由化与民主化中的关键作用。
We exploit a 2004 credit reform in Brazil that simplified the sale of repossessed cars used as collateral for auto loans. We show that the reform expanded credit to riskier, self-employed borrowers who purchased newer, more expensive cars. The legal change has led to larger loans with lower spreads and longer maturities. Although the credit reform improved riskier borrowers' access to credit, it also led to increased incidences of delinquency and default. Our results shed light on the consequences of a credit reform and highlight the crucial role that collateral and repossession play in the liberalization and democratization of credit.