Property rights and the agency problem in China's enterprise reform
从产权和代理问题角度分析中国企业改革，指出1980年代中期的改革仅处理了代理问题而未解决层级合谋，股份制实验首次触及产权关系，但仍存在国有资产被代理人侵占的问题。
This paper analyzes problems in China's enterprise reform from property rights and agency problem perspectives. Reform efforts by the mid 1980s are interpreted as dealing with only the agency problem by relocating the decision process among agents, but not solving the hierarchical collusion problem. The shareholding system experiment is the first effort to deal with property rights relations. Although it seems to have contributed to some improvement in enterprise performance, there still remains the problem of expropriation of state assets by agents seeking irregular private gains. Copyright 1993 by Oxford University Press.