Large Matching Markets as Two-Sided Demand Systems
研究了大规模非转移效用双边匹配市场中，当参与者数量很大时，包容性价值成为可观测类型匹配概率的充分统计量，并证明了稳定匹配的包容性价值收敛到唯一确定性极限，从而刻画了匹配市场的极限分布，为支付参数的识别和估计提供了基础。
This paper studies two-sided matching markets with non-transferable utility when the number of market participants grows large. We consider a model in which each agent has a random preference ordering over individual potential matching partners, and agents' types are only partially observed by the econometrician. We show that in a large market, the inclusive value is a sufficient statistic for an agent's endogenous choice set with respect to the probability of being matched to a spouse of a given observable type. Furthermore, while the number of pairwise stable matchings for a typical realization of random utilities grows at a fast rate as the number of market participants increases, the inclusive values resulting from any stable matching converge to a unique deterministic limit. We can therefore characterize the limiting distribution of the matching market as the unique solution to a fixed-point condition on the inclusive values. Finally we analyze identification and estimation of payoff parameters from the asymptotic distribution of observable characteristics at the level of pairs resulting from a stable matching.