Design Innovation and Fashion Cycles
构建了一个时尚周期模型，将时尚视为约会游戏中的信号工具。垄断设计师以固定成本创新设计，价格随时间下降并扩散，当足够多人拥有后新周期开始。竞争下时尚变化更慢、价格更高。
A model of fashion cycles is developed in which fashion is used as a signalling device in a "dating-game". We assume that there is a designer (monopolist) who can create new designs at a positive fixed cost and zero marginal cost. Designs are durable commodities. We show the existence of equilibria of the following form: Every T periods a new design is innovated. Over time the price of the design falls and it spreads to more and more agents. Once sufficiently many agents own the design it is profitable to create a new design and a new fashion cycle begins. We also examine the case when there is competition among potential deisigners and show that there are equilibria in which fashion changes less frequent and the price of fashion remains bounded above the corresponding price in the monopoly case.