Optimal Life‐Cycle Capital Taxation Under Self‐Control Problems
研究了存在自我控制问题的经济体中储蓄的最优税收，发现若自我控制能力随年龄凹性增长，则储蓄应获补贴且补贴随年龄递减，定量上补贴规模与401(k)计划相当。
We study optimal taxation of savings in an economy where agents face self‐control problems and the severity of these problems possibly depends on age. Focusing on quasi‐hyperbolic discounting, we show that if agents’ ability to self‐control increases concavely with age, then savings should be subsidised and the subsidy should decrease with age. Quantitatively, we find that the optimal subsidies in our calibrated model with age‐dependent self‐control are much larger than those implied by models with constant self‐control. Our optimal subsidies are of comparable magnitudes to those implied by the 401(k) plan, even though the latter prescribes subsidies increasing with age.