The Role of Contracts on Quality and Returns to Quality in Offshore Software Development Outsourcing
研究了时间与材料合同和固定价格合同两种合同类型对软件外包开发质量的影响，发现固定价格合同能激励供应商提供更高质量，且高质量仅在固定价格合同中带来更高利润。
ABSTRACT In this study, we examine how the different incentive structures inherent in two primary contract types—time and materials (T&M) and fixed price (FP)—influence the quality provided by the vendor in the software development outsourcing industry. We argue that the incentive structure of FP contracts motivates a vendor to be more efficient in the software development process, which results in higher quality as compared to projects executed under a T&M contract. We thus argue that vendors consistently staff FP projects with better trained personnel because they face the most risk on these contracts, resulting in better outcomes on these projects. We extend our analysis to propose that providing higher quality is associated with higher profit margins for the vendor only for FP contracts. We develop and test these hypotheses on data collected from 100 software projects completed by a leading Indian offshore vendor. The results provide strong support for our fundamental thesis that the drivers of and returns to quality vary by contract type. We discuss the implications of our research for both researchers and practitioners.