Under the Radar: The Effects of Monitoring Firms on Tax Compliance
利用西班牙大型纳税人单位的准实验变化，发现企业为规避严格税收监控而策略性地将收入报告在门槛以下，且该效应在交易留痕多的行业更强，表明扩大监控至小企业可带来显著福利收益。
This paper analyzes the effects of size-dependent tax enforcement on firms’ tax compliance. We exploit quasi-experimental variation generated by a Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU) in Spain, which monitors firms with more than €6 million in reported revenue. Firms strategically bunch below the eligibility threshold in order to avoid stricter tax enforcement. The response is stronger in sectors where transactions leave more paper trail, suggesting that monitoring effort and the traceability of information reported by firms are complements. We estimate that there would be substantial welfare gains from extending stricter tax monitoring to smaller businesses.