Adverse Selection in the Annuity Market and the Role for Social Security
研究了当年金市场存在逆向选择时，社会保障在提供保险方面的作用。通过模型计算强制年金化相对于自由放任基准的福利收益，发现收益较小，因为社会保障挤出了高死亡率个体的需求。
I study the role of social security in providing insurance when there is adverse selection in the annuity market. I calculate welfare gain from mandatory annuitization in the social security system relative to a laissez-faire benchmark, using a model in which individuals have private information about their mortality. I estimate large heterogeneity in mortality using the Health and Retirement Study. Despite that, I find small welfare gain from mandatory annuitization. Social security has a large effect on annuity prices because it crowds out demand by high-mortality individuals. Welfare gain would have been significantly larger in the absence of this effect.