Public Policy Towards R&D in Oligopolistic Industries
分析寡头垄断行业中企业先研发后竞争的市场结果与社会最优的差距，发现企业策略行为会减少研发和福利，从而需要更高补贴，但研发溢出低时例外。
The authors consider the free-market and socially optimal outcomes in a general oligopoly model with many firms which first engage in R&D and then compete in either output or price. Strategic behavior by firms tends to reduce output, R&D, and welfare and so justifies higher subsidies except when R&D spillovers are low and firms' actions are strategic substitutes. It also reduces the benefits of R&D cooperation. Moreover, policies to encourage cooperation are likely to be redundant (since it is always privately profitable) and simulations suggest that the welfare cost of lax competition policy is high. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.