Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium
将竞争性搜索均衡概念扩展到存在逆向选择的私人信息环境，刻画了委托人发布分离契约、代理人权衡条款与匹配概率的均衡，并应用于信号、保险和柠檬市场模型。
We extend the concept of competitive search equilibrium to environments with private information, and in particular adverse selection.Principals (e.g.employers or agents who want to buy assets) post contracts, which we model as revelation mechanisms.Agents (e.g.workers, or asset holders) have private information about the potential gains from trade.Agents observe the posted contracts and decide where to apply, trading off the contracts' terms of trade against the probability of matching, which depends in general on the principals' capacity constraints and market search frictions.We characterize equilibrium as the solution to a constrained optimization problem, and prove that principals offer separating contracts to attract different types of agents.We then present a series of applications, including models of signaling, insurance, and lemons.These illustrate the usefulness and generality of the approach, and serve to contrast our findings with standard results in both the contract and search literatures.